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"LADY MADONNA, CHILDREN AT YOUR FEET":
TRAGEDIES AT THE INTERSECTION OF MOTHERHOOD,
MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW
MICHELLE OBERMAN**
Tragedies, great and small, occur with stunning frequency at
the intersection of motherhood, madness and the law. Women
suffering from postpartum mental illness encounter the legal
system in a host of settings: filicide, child abuse and neglect, suicide,
divorce, child custody disputes, and employment and insurance
related issues. For women with postpartum mental illness, trouble
with the law often begins and ends with the fact that they are
mothers. Motherhood carries with it a specific set of socio-cultural
norms and expectations. For a variety of reasons, some women, if
not many, are ill equipped to meet these expectations. Postpartum
mental illness may be viewed as simply one factor, among many,
that impairs a woman's ability to meet the tasks of motherhood.
This article will describe the range of cases found at the
intersection of motherhood, mental illness and the law. In so doing,
it will expose the inadequacy of existing legal frameworks for
understanding postpartum mental illness. Increasingly, the law is
confronting and acknowledging the existence of postpartum mental
health conditions. Nonetheless, the law's present approach to
postpartum disorders tends to be confused by virtue of the fact that
existing legal frameworks for understanding mental illness fail to
capture the essence of postpartum mental illness. The law's binary
approach to mental illness, in which one either is sane or insane,
competent or incompetent, or able-bodied or disabled, simply fails
to accommodate the vast majority of women who struggle with
postpartum mental illness. The fact of the matter is that organic
mental illness alone cannot account for much of what goes wrong
for mothers who find themselves at the intersection of madness and
the law.
For centuries, medical experts have described postpartum
mental disorders and struggled to discern their origins.1 This
* The title phrase "Lady Madonna, children at your feet" comes from the Beatles song
"Lady Madonna" (1968). See ALAN ALDRIDGE, THE BEATLES ILLUSTRATED LYRICS 57 (1991).
It is intended as a nod both to the Beatles, for their astute depiction of the struggles that are
found in the mundane work of mothering, and also to my dear friend, Professor Michael L.
Perlin, whose Dylan-esque wit serves as a constant source of inspiration to me. My thanks are
due to him, and also to Allyson Esposito, DePaul College of Law, class of 2005, for her
talented assistance in researching this article.
** Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. Cheryl L. Meyer & Margaret G. Spinelli, Medical and Legal Dilemmas of Postpartum
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struggle began as early as Hippocrates, who described what we now
know as postpartum psychosis, and attributed it to "excessive blood
flow to the brain."2 In more recent times, physicians have recognized
postpartum mental disorders as variations on generic mental
illnesses such as psychosis and depression, but have disagreed
about the exact criteria for diagnosis.3 In spite of these difficulties,
experts today are in consensus regarding the fact that there is a
spectrum of postpartum mental disorders, ranging from the relatively
common mild and fleeting depression to the rare cases of full-blown
psychosis, that are associated with the postpartum period.4
It is clear that postpartum mental disorders arise, in part, from
a woman's physiological responses to pregnancy and childbirth.5
Psychiatric Disorders, in INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIALAND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS
WHO KILL 167, 168 (Margaret G. Spinelli, ed., 2003)[hereinafter INFANTICIDE]. See also Cheryl
L. Meyer et al., Postpartum Syndromes: Disparate Treatment in the Legal System, in IT'S A
CRIME: WOMEN AND JUSTICE 91 (Roslyn Muraskin ed., 2d ed. 2000).
2. Meyer et al., supra note 1, at 91.
3. Id. at 92-93, (summarizing classification problems in both the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV)). When determining the cause of postpartum mental illness, some mental
health experts focus on the hormonal shifts that occur during and around the birthing process
and on a woman's predisposition for mental illness. Id. at 94. On the other hand, feminist
researchers and practitioners believe that postpartum syndromes also may be viewed as a
natural response to a society that devalues motherhood. See Id. at 103. This group focuses on
sociological factors that may contribute to postpartum syndromes, such as single motherhood,
decisions to stop working outside the home, or a lack of social support. Id. At 101-02. They
propose a treatment of counseling, both with and without partners. See generally Scott P.
Stuart, InterpersonalPsychologyforPostpartum Depression, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS
143-162 (Laura J. Miller, ed. 1999).
4. By far the most common form of postpartum mental health ailment is mild
postpartum depression, commonly known as baby blues. This fleeting form of depression
occurs so commonly that it is regarded as normal. Irvin D. Yalom et al., "Postpartum Blues"
Syndrome: A Description and Related Variables, 18 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 16, 16 (1968)
(estimating that between five percent and eighty percent of women experience some kind of
postpartum psychiatric disorder). Onset is typically somewhere between the third and fifth
days after delivery, and usually only lasts a few days. Symptoms usually include irritability,
dysphoria, anxiety, and inability to think clearly. See generally Laura J. Miller & Margaret
Rukstalis, Beyond the"Blues" HypothesesAbout Postpartum Reactivity, in POSTPARTUM MOOD
DISORDERS, supra note 3, at 3-16. Postpartum depression, the second category of postpartum
disorders is more severe, lasting longer than 'baby blues.' Barbara L. Parry, Postpartum
Depression in Relation to Other Reproductive Cycle Mood Changes, in POSTPARTUM MOOD
DISORDERS, supra note 3, at 28. It occurs in ten percent of women and may have a delayed
onset of anywhere from six weeks to three to four months after delivery, and typically lasts
six months to a year. Id. Postpartum psychosis is much more rare and much more severe than
either 'baby blues' or postpartum depression. It occurs in approximately one out of every five
hundred to one thousand births, and has a rapid onset within the first few days to two to
three weeks after delivery. Meir Steiner & William Y.K. Tam, Postpartum Depression in
Relation to Other Psychiatric Disorders, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS, supra note 3, at
48. Women with a history of psychiatric illness are most at risk for this type of postpartum
disorder. Id.
5. See Miller & Ruskstalis, supra note 4, at 9-16; Victoria Hendrick & Lori L. Altshuler,
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What complicates the matter, however, is the considerable evidence
that physiological explanations alone do not account for the incidence
of these disorders. For instance, numerous studies demonstrate that
new mothers who lack sufficient social support are at greater risk
for developing a postpartum mental disorder.6 Additional evidence
that the origins of postpartum mental illness may not be strictly
physiological comes from the well-established fact that postpartum
syndromes occur with far less frequency in non-Western cultures.7
Two different studies suggest that the development of postpartum
mental disorders may be inhibited by cultural structures that support
new mothers.8 For instance, some non-Western cultures mandate a
period of rest and seclusion for new mothers, offer mothers assistance
in the form of social and financial support, and use rituals to
structure a distinct postpartum time period, during which the mother
is recognized as having attained a new social status.9
It remains unclear whether social support can prevent postpartum
mental illness, or whether it simply protects mothers and their
children against the potential threat posed by such illnesses. For
instance, it seems obvious that the risks posed even by severe
postpartum mental illness are inhibited in a culture in which a new
mother is accompanied and assisted, on a full-time basis, by her own
mother and other female relatives. Toward this end, it is critical to
observe the dramatic changes in family structure that the West, and
particularly the United States, experienced in the latter decades of
Biological Determinants of Postpartum Depression, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS, supra
note 3, at 66-78 (finding that biological factors influence women's vulnerability to major
depression during postpartum because this period is a time of rapid and dramatic physiologic
change). See also Deborah Siechel, Neurohormonal Aspects of Postpartum Depression and
Psychosis, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 1, at 76.
6. Meyer et al., supra note 1, at 102. See also John J. Harding, Postpartum Psychiatric
Disorders: A Review, 30 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 109-12 (1989); Christina Lee, Social
Context, Depression and the Transition to Motherhood, 2 BRIT. J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 93-108
(1997); Valerie Thurtle, Post-natal Depression: The Relevance of Sociological Approaches, 22
J. ADVANCED NURSING 416-424 (1995) (finding that certain sociocultural factors, such as single
motherhood, lack of social support, and other stressful life events increase a woman's risk for
developing a postpartum depression). See generally Bonnie Fox & Diana Worts, Revisiting
the Critique of Medicalized Childbirth. A Contribution to the Sociology of Birth, 13 GENDER
& Soc. 326-46(1999 ) (finding that of forty women giving birth for the first time, women with
strong support from their partners were less likely to develop a postpartum syndrome, and
that the development of 'baby blues' was related to feeling overwhelmed by the responsibilities
of motherhood).
7. See M.J. Hayes et al., Transactional Conflict Between Psychobiology and Culture in
the Etiology of Postpartum Depression, 55(3) MED. HYPOTHESES 266, 271 (2000).
8. Id. at 266-76; G. Stern & L. Kruckman, Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Post-Partum
Depression: An Anthropological Critique, 17(5) Soc. SCI. & MED., 1027-41 (1983).
9. Stern & Kruckman, supra note 9, at 1027-41.
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the twentieth century." At the very least, it seems plausible to
surmise that postpartum mental illness has become far more
visible, if not more common, due to the breakdown of family
structures that formerly supported new mothers.
It was inevitable that the combination of the growing medical
consensus about and the increased visibility of postpartum mental
illness would force the legal system to contend with issues pertaining
to postpartum mental illness in a wide variety of contexts. This
article will examine three such contexts: when raised as an excuse
or for mitigation by a criminal defendant, when raised in the context
of various family law proceedings, and as it relates to issues of
employment or insurance. This article explores the challenges posed
by postpartum mental illness in each of these settings, and evaluates
the legal system's response to postpartum mental illness. Finally,
this article concludes by considering the challenges and risks posed
to the legal system by adopting this nuanced model of mental
illness, and the best ways of containing those risks.
I. POSTPARTUM MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW:
FILICIDE CASES"
Every year, in the United States alone, several hundred
mothers kill their children.2 Only a fraction of these crimes are
committed by mothers who are suffering from a postpartum mental
illness, specifically postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis. 3
The criminal justice system seems to struggle with these cases,
achieving inconsistent results, in which it is not unusual for
mothers with documented postpartum mental illnesses to receive
lengthy prison sentences."
10. By the end of the twentieth century, close to 30 percent of all households with
children under the age of eighteen were headed by one parent rather than two.
Single parenthood in the context of a fragmented community and in the absence
of an extended family means that all the tasks of parenting must be borne more
or less alone.
CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN:
UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE "PROM MOM," 13 (2001)
[hereinafter MEYER & OBERMAN](citing Zainab Chaudry, The Myth of Misogyny, 61 ALB. L.
REv. 511, 513 (1997).
11. Often termed infanticide, this article will use the scientific term of filicide,
increasingly embraced by the international community, when referring to a mother's act of
killing of her child or children.
12. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 10, at 46 ("... estimates for annual occurrences
of neonaticide range between 150 and 300.*) (citation omitted).
13. Approximately eight percent of cases involvingimothers who kill their children involve
mothers who suffer from a diagnosed postpartum disorder. See id., at 92.
14. Id., at 60.
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After a brief overview of the insanity defense, which is the legal
lens through which the U.S. criminal justice system views
postpartum mental illness, this section will examine the way in
which the legal system is responding to women who assert
postpartum mental illness in defense against criminal charges.
A. Brief Overview of the Defenses of Mental Incompetence and
Insanity in the U.S. Legal System
Unlike many countries around the world, the United States
does not have a specific criminal statute that governs the crime of
filicide. 5 As a result, American mothers who kill their children are
charged with a wide variety of offenses, including murder," and are
only able to assert the standard range of criminal defenses. To the
extent that the criminal law recognizes postpartum mental illness,
it recognizes it as a form of insanity as it pertains either to the
woman's competence to stand trial or to her culpability for the crime.'7
The issue of competence to stand trial refers to the ability of a
defendant to understand the charges against her and to assist her
counsel at trial. A woman with extremely severe postpartum mental
illness may be incompetent to stand trial, but generally speaking,
most women who were suffering from postpartum mental illness
when they killed their children have recovered enough to be found
competent by the time of trial.18 Moreover, there is little long-term
benefit to the defendant who is found incompetent to stand trial, as
she will be confined to a mental health facility indefinitely, until she
is found competent. 9
The more significant legal mechanism for adducing evidence of
postpartum mental illness lies in the insanity defense. The exact
language for determining legal insanity varies across jurisdictions,
but the majority of states require some version of the M'Naghten
test-a showing that at the time of her act, disease prevented the
defendant from knowing either the nature and quality of her act, or
that the act was wrong.20
15. See infra note 79 (discussing the British Infanticide Act).
16. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 10, at 58.
17. Meyer et al., supra note 1, at 95.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. GARY B. MELTON ETAL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAwYERs 190-93 (2d ed. 1997). See Meyer et al.,
supra note 1, at 95.
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This standard, which focuses on the defendant's cognitive state
of mind, is widely criticized as being obsolete and out of keeping
with contemporary understandings regarding mental illness and its
effect on one's ability to control one's actions.2" Specifically, the
consensus among mental health experts today is that mental illness
may significantly impair one's capacity to control one's actions or
impulses, thus leading an individual to commit acts that they know
to be morally wrong.22 As will be seen in the following discussion, it
is this distinction that operates to the detriment offilicide defendants,
among others, as the mothers virtually always understand that it is
morally wrong to kill their children.
A final manner in which postpartum mental illness arises in the
context of criminal cases is in the sentencing phase, when judges
and juries may be moved to mitigate the severity of punishment
in response to evidence that the defendant was suffering from mental
illness.' Because judges and juries need not articulate the
justifications for their sentences, it is difficult to know how often or
how dramatically evidence of postpartum mental illness influences
the sentences meted out to mothers who kill.
B. Filicide and Postpartum Mental Illness
In my past work on the topic of mothers who kill their children,
my co-author Cheryl L. Meyer and I have identified five basic
categories of filicide.24 These include neonaticide, fatal neglect, fatal
abuse, assisted or coerced filicide and purposeful filicide.' Although
mental illness is found among mothers in all five categories, it is the
last category-that of purposeful filicide-which encompasses the
majority of mothers who kill their children while suffering from
postpartum mental illness. 6
21. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.2(c ) (4th ed. 2003); Daniel M'Naghten's
Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,718 (1843); Maria Massucci & James A. Pitaro, Note, Victimization as
a Defense: Valid Protection for the Innocent or Escape from Criminal Responsibility?, 8 ST.
JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 305,327 (1992) (stating that the M'Naghten test is the model most
frequently incorporated into state penal statutes for insanity defenses); Sandy Meng Shan
Liu, Comment,PostpartumPsychosis:ALegitimateDefenseforNegating CriminalResponsibility,
4 SCHoLAR 339, 366 (2002).
22. See Liu, supra note 21, at 366; RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL
CULPABILITY 24-25 (1995).
23. Meyer at al., supra note 3, at 96.
24. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 10, at 36-38.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 38.
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The category of purposeful filicide refers to mothers who
deliberately kill their children.27 Some of these mothers, but not all,
suffer from psychotic delusions or profound depression triggered by
their bodies' hormonal response to pregnancy, labor and delivery.28
An excellent example of this phenomenon is found in the case of
Andrea Yates, who was suffering from postpartum psychosis when
she "drowned her five children (ages six months to seven years)."'
In the aftermath of the killings, a troubling view of Yates' daily
life emerged. Yates was, by all accounts, a devoted and loving mother,
who was working at home to raise her five children.3° Indeed, more
than merely being a stay-at-home mom, Yates was home-schooling
the children-a monumental task given that there were five of them,
all under the age of eight.3" In addition to caring for her children,
Yates served as a primary caretaker for her father, who suffered
from Alzheimer's disease for the eight years preceding his death.32
At the time of the murders, Yates already had a long history of
psychiatric illness.' Her first experience of postpartum mental
illness occurred shortly after the birth of her first child, Noah, in
1994, "when she felt Satan's presence and 'heard Satan's voice' tell
her to 'pick up the knife and stab the child. ""'3 Yates tried to forget
this episode, not telling anyone, but it kept recurring over the years,
in the form of an apparition telling her to "get a knife."35
Yates was not formally diagnosed with postpartum depression
until after the birth of her fourth son in February of 1999.36 Her
depression was extremely severe. She attempted suicide twice, and
subsequently was hospitalized.37 Through the use of psychotropic
medicine, Yates' illness eventually improved.38
Although her doctors were concerned when she became pregnant
again, the birth of her fifth child in November 2000 initially
27. Id.
28. Id. at 92.
29. Margaret G. Spinelli, Introduction to INFANTICIDE, supra note 1, at xvi-xvii.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Evan Thomas, Motherhood and Murder, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 2001, at 20.
33. Spinelli, supra note 29, at xvii.
34. Id.
35. Bill Hewitt et al., Life or Death: Does Andrea Yates, on Trial for Murder in Houston,
Deserve Mercy for Drowning Her Five Kids? Or is She, as Prosecutors Argue, Fully Responsible
for the Crimes They Say She had Contemplated for Months?, PEOPLE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 82.
36. Id. See also Laura Parker, Coalition Supports Houston Mom, USA TODAY, Aug. 28,
2001, at lA.
37. Hewitt et al., supra note 35.
38. Id.
20031
40 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 10:033
did not seem to trigger any major postpartum depression.39 When
Yates' father died in March of 2001, however, all her symptoms
returned and worsened.'o She became profoundly withdrawn, and her
family recognized that Yates appeared to be catatonic. 1 She was
hospitalized, but was discharged after twelve days. 2 The medication
was not as successful this time." Consequently, two weeks before the
tragedy, her psychiatrist changed her medication, discontinuing her
antipsychotic medication.
In June 2001, in the throes of a full-blown psychotic episode,
Yates succumbed to the voices in her head, and killed her children."
After her arrest, she requested a razor to shave her head and reveal
the "mark of the beast-666" that she believed was on her scalp.'
The state of Texas charged Yates with capital murder." The
jury reached a guilty verdict after several hours of deliberation. 7 It
took them only thirty-five minutes to reject the prosecution's bid for
the death penalty, opting instead for a life sentence."
The Yates case is atypical in the number of children killed, but
in many other aspects, it is quite typical. Postpartum mental illness,
even after diagnosis, is quite difficult to treat. This is in part
because doctors only recently have reached consensus about the
existence and etiology of these disorders. 9 But it also is due to the
fact that treatment is quite difficult. This is readily apparent when
one considers the problem of suicide among women suffering from
postpartum mental illness.'
39. Id.
40. Id.; Thomas, supra note 32.
41. Spinelli, supra note 29, at xvii.
42. Hewitt et al., supra note 35.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Spinelli, supra note 29, at xvii.
46. Hewitt et al., supra note 35.
47. Spinelli, supra note 29, at xvii.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
50. See Steiner & Tam, supra note 4, at 49. For a woman suffering from postpartum
illness, suicide is at least as great a risk as harming her children. For instance, consider the
case of Melanie Stokes. On June 11, 2001, Ms. Stokes, 41,jumped from a hotel window to her
death, less than four months after giving birth to her daughter, Sommer Skyy. Prior to the
birth of her child at forty, she led a nearly perfect life by all accounts, and was excited about
the prospect of having a child even before she knew she was pregnant. After her daughter's
birth, she showed signs of severe depression, and was unable to care for herself or her baby.
Three hospitalizations and ten different medications later, she continued to suffer. Despite
the fact that she was constantly being watched and cared for by her loving family, they could
not keep her safe or prevent her from harming herself. Postpartum disorders "are often
diagnosed late or not at all. Treatment, if it's available, may be a matter of guesswork. People
can get sick and sicker with the speed and unpredictability of an avalanche." Louise Kiernan,
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The problem of treatment is all the more complicated for a
mother who has other children. Ms. Yates was hospitalized on several
occasions, but on each occasion, she was released back to her home,
so that she could resume caring for her five children."1 Her doctors
had little reason to believe that she was "cured," or that their
treatment had rendered her capable of handling the enormous
emotional, physical, and psychological demands she faced at home. 2
Indeed, in retrospect, it seemed that the structure of her home life,
given the frailty of her mental status, was a prescription for disaster.
A second aspect of the Yates case that commonly is seen in
filicide cases involving postpartum mental illness is that of
maternal isolation.53 For the most part, when Andrea Yates suffered
from her suicidal delusions and her paralyzing depression, she did
so alone. Her neighbors had little idea that she was troubled. 4 Her
only respite was the occasional visit from her mother-in-law and the
relief offered by her husband, whose beliefs about the home and
family are best explained in a statement he made to the prosecutor:
"Man is the breadwinner and woman is the homemaker."55 His wife
had only two hours of personal time each week.56 Under such
circumstances, it simply is inaccurate to assert that her mental
illness was the sole cause of the death of her children. Had she had
a solid support network consisting of family and friends, she might
have been able to wait out the course of treatment needed to cure
her of her psychosis. Had a community of trusted family and friends
known of her illness, she would not have been left alone with her
children immediately upon her release from the hospital.
C. Filicide, Postpartum Mental Illness and the Insanity Defense
One of the most remarkable things about the Yates case was
the extent to which experts on both sides agreed about the fact that
Ms. Yates was profoundly mentally ill.57 Yates pled not guilty by
reason of insanity to her charge of capital murder.58 In order to be
Descent into Darkness, CHI. TRB., Feb. 16, 2003, at 1.
51. Margaret G. Spinelli, The Promise of Saved Lives: Recognition, Prevention and
Rehabilitation, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 1, at 245.
52. Id. at 245-46.
53. See ANN L. DUNNEWOLD, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT OF POSTPARTUM EMOTIONAL
DISORDERS 19-20 (1997).
54. See Thomas, supra note 32.
55. Spinelli, The Promise of Saved Lives, supra note 51, at 245.
56. Id.
57. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 1, at 175.
58. Id. at 174.
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found not guilty for reasons of insanity in Texas, however, the law
required that Mrs. Yates prove "failure to know the act was wrong,"
one of the more restrictive legal insanity standards derived from the
M'Naghten Rule.59 The defense maintained that she did not know
right from wrong at the time of the killings because she was in a
psychotic state.60 However, the prosecution asserted that she knew
right from wrong at the time of the killings because she had called
both her husband and 911 to confess to having killed her children."
This evidence, the prosecutors successfully claimed, showed that she
knew that her actions were wrong, and seemed to undermine her
claim of insanity.6"
Although it likely is true that the majority of women with
postpartum mental illness who plead insanity do not succeed, some
experts believe that the insanity defense is somewhat more
successful when raised by this particular population than it is in
general. Professor Michael Perlin suggests that these mothers who
kill might be considered "empathy outliers," as they are slightly
more likely to succeed in garnering a jury's empathy in response to
their desperate mental illness.63 Indeed, in recent years, several
women who killed family members while suffering from postpartum
psychosis have successfully invoked the insanity defense.'
59. See id., at 174-77. See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.0 1(a) (2003) ("It is an affirmative
defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe
mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong."); 2-53 TEX. CRIM. PRAC.
GUIDE § 53.303 (Procedure for use of Insanity Defense).
60. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 1, at 175.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 174-76. However, the verdict may also reflect the considerable
misinformation among jurors who did not believe her postpartum syndrome defense, or
perhaps did not understand the judge's instructions regarding the "not guilty for reasons of
insanity" verdict.
63. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 192 (1994). See
also Henry J. Steadman et al., The Use of the Insanity Defense, in REPORT TO GOV. HUGH L.
CAREY ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK, 68-69 (1978 ) (prepared under the direction
of William A. Carnahan, Deputy Commissioner and Counsel ) (finding,
that society, in its desire to preserve an illusion of "mother love," is hesitant to
carefully scrutinize the mother-child relationship and recognize realistically that
the most reasonable target for a mother's frustration and anger is her child.
Instead, to preserve our illusions about "mother love," we categorize women who
murder their children as "insane").
64. See, e.g., the case of Susan Mooney, a successful Wall Street executive who was
charged with the second-degree murder of her seven month old son in 2001. In November of
2002, a New York judge found her not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, accepting
the defense's argument that she suffered from postpartum psychosis and did not know what
she was doing at the time. She remains at a secure, state-operated mental facility. Chrisena
Coleman, Killer Mom Will Stay in Psych Hosp, DAILY NEWS (NEW YORK), Apr. 30, 2003,
Suburban at 1; Chrisena Coleman, Mom Avoids Prison in Baby Death, DAILY NEWS (NEW
YORK), Nov. 15, 2002, News at 10. See also the case of Maria Amaya, who slit the throats of
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Even when a court accepts the fact that a woman's criminal
actions were the result of postpartum mental illness, and finds her
not guilty for reasons of insanity (NGRI), the unique nature of these
mental illnesses often defies easy resolution. Typically speaking, a
defendant who is found NGRI is ordered to reside in a mental
facility until such time as she or he is determined to pose no further
danger to herself or others.' Studies demonstrate that, on average,
defendants who are sentenced to mental facilities serve longer
sentences in mental hospitals than do those who are found guilty
and sentenced to prison.6 Postpartum mental illness poses a
challenge to the disposition of criminal cases in that it typically is
not a chronic medical condition, and, when properly treated, the
mothers often experience a full recovery in a relatively short period
of timeY.6 Thus, although they were found to have been insane at the
time of their crimes, some, if not many, of these women do not
require long-term institutionalization for mental illness. As a result,
the criminal justice system must grapple with the underlying
justifications for incarceration and punishment.
The case of Sheryl Massip illustrates this problem. Massip was
a California woman who was charged with killing her six-week-old
son while suffering from postpartum psychosis.' By the time of her
trial, Massip's symptoms had disappeared and she was no
her four children as they slept in their beds, then tried to kill herself. In 1992, two years after
her children's deaths, Amaya was found fit to stand trial, but the district attorney's
psychiatrist found she had been so mentally ill at the time of the killings that she did not
appreciate the consequences of her own actions. She was found not guilty, and was sentenced
to remain at a supervised residential housing center for the mentally ill. Caren Halbfinger,
Local Slayings, Yates Cases Present a Stark Contrast, J. NEwS, Mar. 17, 2002, at 1A; Mike
Tolson, Unequal Justice; Criminal Punishment Widely Disparate in Maternal Filicide Cases
Such as Yates', HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 10, 2001, § A at 1. For an example of a case in which
evidence of postpartum psychosis was used to mitigate the severity of the punishment, see the
case of Seems Rothstein, in June of 2002, in which a wife stabbed herself and husband, killing
him. After an agreement was reached by both sides, she pled guilty to involuntary
manslaughter and received a five-year suspended sentence. Maria Glod, No Prison Term In
Man's Slaying; Fairfax Wife Had Postpartum Psychosis, WASH. POST, Jul. 26, 2002, at B7;
Tom Jackson & Maria Glod, Muhammad's Appointed Lawyer Prizes Ideal of Justice for All,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2002, at A8.
65. PERLIN, supra note 63, at 4 (finding that not only are stays in mental facilities
typically longer than the average prison sentence, they often are far more restrictive than
many prisons or reformatories).
66. Id,
67. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 10, at 12 (citing Michael W. O'Hara, Postpartum
"Blues,"Depression and Psychosis:A Review, 7 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
205 (1987)).
68. Eric Lichtblau, Appeal Argued in Postpartum Case, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 24,
1990, at B1. At Massip's 1987 murder trial, evidence showed that she threw her son into
oncoming traffic, picked him up and carried him to her garage, hit him over the head with a
blunt object, and the finally killed him by running him over with her car. Id.
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longer psychotic.69 The jury found Massip guilty of second-degree
murder, based on their discomfort with the notion that she would
otherwise avoid being punished for her crime.7" Two months later,
however, the judge overturned the jury verdict and acquitted Massip
on temporary insanity grounds, ordering her to undergo at least one
year of outpatient therapy to treat her postpartum psychosis.7 1 The
judge believed the record clearly showed that Massip was
emotionally disturbed. 72 The appellate court affirmed on insanity
grounds, saying that the defendant did not have the requisite state
of mind to commit the murder because she was suffering from
postpartum mental illness.7"
More recently, a Connecticut court refused to relinquish
jurisdiction over Dawn March, who was found NGRI in October of
1991, for the drowning death of her six month old child. 4 In spite of
the fact that all of the medical experts agreed that she no longer was
mentally ill, and that her behavior while on conditional release was
without blemish, the court asserted its right to retain jurisdiction due
to severity of the offense.76
The complexity of these cases, both in terms of the circumstances
leading up to the crimes, and in terms of the perceived justifications
for incarceration and punishment, is enormous. It is no wonder
that so many nations around the world elect to view filicide as a sui
69. Id.
70. People v. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. App. 1990).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. See also Mary Lentz, A Postmortem of the Post Partum Psychosis Defense, 18 CAP.
U. L. REv. 525, 536 (1989); Tricia L. Schroeder, Note, Postpartum Psychosis as a Defense for
Murder, 21 W. ST. U. L. REV. 267,279 (1993); Liu, supra note 21, at 15-16. See also Michelle
Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide, 34 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1996) [hereinafter Oberman, Mothers Who Kill].
74. State v. Dawn March, 265 Conn. 697, 830 A.2d 212 (2003).
75. Id.; See also Halbfinger, supra note 64, at 1A (describing the case of Maria Amaya).
Maria Amaya was originally found not competent to stand trial after she killed her four
children. The injuries she sustained in trying to take her own life required major surgical
reconstruction, and she was hospitalized and treated for nearly two years. Once she recovered
from her physical injuries, Amaya was sent to a secure state hospital. After responding to
treatment, she was found mentally competent to stand trial. In 1992, the prosecution and the
court accepted her guilty plea. She then spent another two years in a less secure psychiatric
center, as ordered by the court. By 1994, a psychiatric report described her as a model patient
who was cooperative and helpful. In June of 1999, a New York judge ordered Amaya to attend
an outpatient treatment program for five years. Since then, she has been living in dormitory-
style housing for people recovering from mental illness. Upon her release, comments from the
assistant district attorney who prosecuted the case, as well as the former police chief of the
town in which Amaya lived, revealed a sense that she had not really paid for her crime. They
believed she should have been criminally penalized because she took the lives of four children,
whether she was insane or not. While they felt sympathy for Amaya, they did not think she
should be out in public.
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generis offense, and to treat the cases in a consistent, and highly
medicalized fashion.76 Some countries go even farther than the
standard English 1938 Infanticide Act, which reduces the severity
of the criminal act from murder to manslaughter, and generally
punishes the crime with probation." According to Professor Gary
Slapper, "in some countries, such as Sweden, such cases are
taken within the province of a panel of doctors, not the criminal
justice system."78
The medicalized approach taken by nations with infanticide
statutes, or by nations such as Sweden, has its own flaws. Although
there may be sociological or cultural-justifications for treating all
filicide cases differently from other forms of homicide, the laws are
predicated upon scientific explanations. That is, they allow a woman
relief based upon the notion that, during the course of the first
twelve months following a child's birth, the "balance" of her mind
may be upset for reasons contingent upon childbirth or lactation.79
76. See Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 73, at 18. The following nations are
among those that have criminal codes that recognize filicide as a specific, less culpable form
of homicide: Austria, NEW YORK UNIv.,THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE
AUSTRIAN PENAL ACT 66 (Norbert D. West & Samuel I. Shuman, trans., 1966) [hereinafter
AUSTRIAN PENAL CODE]; Columbia, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN
PENAL CODES, THE COLOMBIAN PENAL CODE 106 (Phanor Eder, trans., 1967) [hereinafter
COLOMBIAN PENAL CODE]; Finland, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN
PENAL CODES, FINNISH PENAL CODE 71 (Mattie Jousten, trans., 1987) [hereinafter FINNISH
PENAL CODE); Greece, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES,
GREEK PENAL CODE 148 (Nicholas B. Lolis, trans., 1950) [hereinafter GREEK PENAL CODE];
Italy, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, ITALIAN PENAL
CODE 193 (Edward M. Wise & Allen Maitlin, trans., 1978) [hereinafter ITALIAN PENAL CODE];
Korea, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERIcAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE KOREAN
CRIMNAL CODE 109 (Paul Ryu, trans., 1960) [hereinafter KOREAN PENAL CODE]; New Zealand,
Crime Act of 1961, in SPENCE & GARROW'S CRIMINAL LAW 135 (W.S. Spence, ed., 1962)
[hereinafter New Zealand Crime Act of 1961]; The Phillippines, THE REVISED PENAL CODE
ANNOTATED 355 (Jose Nolledo, ed., 1988) [hereinafter PHILIPPINE PENAL CODE]; Turkey, NEW
YoRK UNIV.,THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE
145 (Orphan Sepici & Mustafa Ovacik, trans., 1965) [hereinafter TURKISH PENAL CODE].
77. Gary Slapper, Mothers, Madness and Medieval Justice, TIMES LONDON, Feb. 4, 2003
at 3, available at 2003 WL 3101696.
78. Id.
79. See Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 73, at 15. One example of this is the
British Infanticide Act of 1922 which provided that those defendants whose minds were
disturbed as the result of giving birth, if their offense would have amounted to murder, could
only be convicted of manslaughter. The 1922 Act was originally limited to newly born
children, but was amended in 1938 in response to a case that held that the law did not extend
to a woman who killed her thirty-five-day-old child. The amended law included any child
under the age of twelve months, and extended the defense of lactation-related hormonal
imbalance.
The full text of the Infanticide Act reads as follows:
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child being
a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the
balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered
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Women suffering from postpartum mental illness readily meet this
standard. Indeed, most mothers who kill their infants, even those
who are not diagnosed with a postpartum mental disorder, rather
easily meet it.
It is clearly possible, however, that some women who commit
filicide do not suffer from any sort of postpartum mental illness. It
is worth noting the debate provoked by this issue among
contemporary United States experts. The American Psychiatric
Association, in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV), recognizes mood disorders following pregnancy
using the generic category of "affective mental diagnoses with
postpartum onset."' The DSM-IV limits these disorders to episodes
within four weeks of giving birth.8 In contrast, Dr. Laura Miller, an
expert in treating postpartum mental disorders, has found that
these mood disorders are not solely biological in nature, but that
they often arise out of a woman's response to the "sociocultural and
economic" influences in her environment.82 Additionally, postpartum
mental disorders may be triggered by factors such as maternal
isolation and poverty.'I As a result of such influences, symptoms
may arise, and persist, long after the birth of a child."
In spite of their uncertain scientific foundation, infanticide acts
remain popular in the nations with these laws because they
successfully avoid the pitfalls of standard insanity jurisprudence
and honor both the medical community's and society's sense that
these cases are somehow different from standard homicide cases.'
By comparison, the United States' approach to filicide cases seems
decidedly removed from contemporary understandings of the nature
and origins of postpartum mental illness.8 Instead, the insistence
in the United States on viewing these cases through the lens of
from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation
consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the
circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would have amounted
to murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such
offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of
manslaughter of the child.
Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.).
80. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 386 (4th ed. 1994). [hereinafter DSM-IV]
81. Id.
82. See generally Joanne Wile & Maria Arechiga, Sociocultural Aspects of Postpartum
Depression, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS supra note 3, at 83.
83. See id. at 84-85.
84. See Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 73, at 38.
85. Id. at 17-19.
86. See id. at 20-33.
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insanity law seems to be an exercise in absurdity. There seldom is
any real doubt as to the mental instability of mothers who kill their
children while suffering from postpartum psychosis or profound
postpartum depression. More importantly, the questions we ask of
filicidal mothers with postpartum mental illness are almost
completely disconnected from the matter of how and why their
children died. Likewise, whether they pass or fail the tests for
insanity, the manner in which we punish these mothers seems void
of any meaningful inquiry into their moral blameworthiness. This
is not to say that mothers who commit filicide do not merit
punishment, but rather, that any effort to do justice in these cases
requires a careful inquiry into the circumstances that gave rise to
the mother's actions, including her mental health status.
II. POSTPARTUM MENTAL ILLNESS AND ISSUES OF
LEGAL COMPETENCE
Issues relating to postpartum mental illness arise with some
frequency in a host of non-criminal legal contexts. For the most
part, postpartum mental illness-related claims grow out of claims
made, either by a mother, or by her partner, that her postpartum
mental illness rendered her incompetent to engage in a given
activity.8 Generally speaking, courts readily admit evidence and
testimony relating to postpartum mental illness. The primary
difficulty raised by these claims arises from the complex interaction
between the biological and the structural, or socio-cultural forces
that shape postpartum mental illness. In short, courts have little
trouble understanding the debilitating effects of postpartum
depression or psychosis. What is more difficult is determining the
extent to which these medical conditions should excuse a mother's
failure to comply with legal standards expected of the general
population, or mothers in particular. I will explore this problem in
three family law contexts: decisions to relinquish a child for
adoption, child custody disputes, and proceedings to terminate
parental rights.
87. See Meyer et al., supra note 1, at 96.
88. Id. at 97-99.
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A. Postpartum Mental Illness and the Decision to
Relinquish Custody
There are at least four appellate-level cases between 1997 and
2002 in which biological mothers who had relinquished custody of
their children attempted to set aside the adoptions, claiming that
they had surrendered their rights while suffering from postpartum
depression. 9 Adoption contracts are highly regulated, and all states
require a period of time following birth in which a mother can
change her stated intention to relinquish her child, and elect instead
to keep it.' However, adoption cases involving postpartum mental
illness tend to involve mothers who became symptomatic, and
relinquished their children weeks, or even months after birth -
long after the waiting periods had passed.9
For instance, consider the case of C.L.B. v. D.G.B.92 This case
involved a child born to a high school-aged couple that was residing
with the paternal grandparents.93 Within the first month after the
child's birth, the mother, C.L.B., developed severe postpartum depression,
attempted suicide, and required hospitalization and medication. During
her hospitalization, the paternal grandparents cared for the baby.9'
While hospitalized, C.L.B. began to confront her personal history of
89. See, e.g., Adoption of C.L.B. v. D.G.B., 812 So.2d 980 (Miss. 2002 ) (a biological mother
and father had consented to give their child up for adoption. The mother later brought suit
claiming that the adoption was invalid because she had been suffering from postpartum
depression when she consented. The court upheld the adoption, saying the mother failed to
show that she lacked the mental capacity to consent and that she failed to show the adoption
was obtained through duress, fraud, or coercion); See also In re J.A.B., 744 So.2d 575 (Fla.
App. 1999); In re Adoption of C.J.F.T. v. J.W., 1999 WL 332446660 (Utah Ct. App. 1999 ) (a
mother brought suit asking the court to withdraw her consent to give her child up for adoption
because she suffered from postpartum depression; the court upheld the adoption); Croslin v.
Croslin, 1997 WL 44394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (concerning situation where adoptive child's
mother and maternal grandmother filed to set aside the adoption of the mother's child to the
maternal grandfather and his wife. Although the mother argued she had suffered from
postpartum depression, the appellate court found there was insufficient evidence to find that
there was undue influence asserted upon the mother to influence the adoption).
90. See generally Susan Yates Ely, Note, Natural Parents' Right to Withdraw Consent to
Adoption: How Far Should the Right Extend, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 685 (1992-93)
(discussing the concept of delayed revocation). See also Margaret F. Brinig, Note, The Effect
of Transactions Costs on the Market for Babies, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 553, 558 (1994)
(discussing the fact that birth mothers are not allowed to give binding consent until after
children are born).
91. See, e.g., Adoption of C.L.B., 812 So.2d 980; In re Adoption of C.J.F.T, 1999 WL
332446660, Croslin, 1997 WL 44394.
92. Adoption of C.L.B., 812 So.2d at 982.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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childhood physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her father and
grandmother.95 Upon her release, when the baby was six weeks old,
C.L.B. felt incapable of caring for the infant alone and sought legal
advice in order to provide some form of legal guardianship to the
paternal grandparents, and also to restrict her former abusers from
having access to her baby.' At a meeting that was also attended by
the baby's father and the paternal grandmother, the lawyer
suggested having the paternal grandparents adopt the child.97 The
young couple agreed, and final adoption papers were signed when
the baby was approximately eight weeks old."
Over the next few months, as C.L.B.'s medication began to take
effect and she recovered from her postpartum depression, her
relationship with the baby's father disintegrated. 9 Because the
father began living with another woman, C.L.B. left his parent's
property and returned to her parents' home.' ° CLB did not see the
child once she left their home, although the record does not indicate
whether this was due to the grandparents' resistance to her visiting,
to CLB's discomfort with them, or some other reason.101
Two and a half months later, when the baby was just under six
months old, C.L.B. filed a motion to set aside the adoption.0 2 The
court rejected her motion on the grounds that she was unable to
demonstrate that her decision to relinquish custody was the result
of fraud, duress, or undue influence.0" The record showed that,
three days after her admission to the hospital, a social worker's
evaluation found her to have "good decision-making ability," and
that C.L.B. testified, at the time she surrendered custody, that she
was "cured.""'
This result is identical to virtually every reported case involving
postpartum mental illness-related challenges to maternal decisions
to relinquish custody. 1'5 The courts tend to uphold the placements
without any substantive analysis of the extent to which postpartum
depression may have impaired the mother's capacity to enter into a









103. Id., at 984.
104. Id.. at 985.
105. Id.; In re J.A.B., 744 So.2d at 575; Adoption of C.J.F.T., 1999 WL 33244660 at * 1;
Croslin, 1997 WL 44394 at * 1.
20031
50 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 10:033
states is whether the mother's decision resulted from fraud,
duress, or undue influence." Unsurprisingly, mothers whose decision
capacity was impaired by virtue of postpartum mental illness
typically cannot, in the absence of additional facts, meet this
evidentiary burden.
This particular legal inquiry, like that of the test for insanity,
misses the scope of the situation that led to the mother's action.
The decision to relinquish a child is, after all, different from the
decision to buy a new car. Postpartum depression is typified by
the mother's feelings of incompetence with regard to parenting
her child."°7 Untreated, these women become convinced that they
are terrible mothers and that they never will be capable of providing
a loving home for their child."° It is no wonder that the thought of
relinquishing a child is tempting to a woman in this condition.
Likewise it is little wonder that, once they receive treatment and
recover from their depression, some of these women are horrified to
learn that they cannot recover custody of their child.
Judicial decisions regarding adoption tend to be driven by
policies favoring the best interests of the child, which are perceived
106. See Brinig, supra note 90, at 568-69. Because there is no federal regulation or even
federal court review of child custody/adoptions matters, each state has adopted its own
scheme. This results in a huge variation in practice. All of the states fall into one of five
statutory constructions. Twenty, the largest number of states in one category, allow
revocation of consent to adoption under very narrow circumstances. In these states, there
typically there can be no revocation except in cases in which consent was obtained by fraud,
duress, or coercion. The twenty states that allow revocation only upon proof of fraud, duress,
or coercion are as follows: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 26-10A-14 (2003) (fraud or mistake);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112 (2003) (fraud or coercion and in best interest);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West 1997) (fraud or duress); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 16-1504
(2003) (fraud, duress, or undue influence); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 750 § 50/11(Smith-
Hurd 2003) (within twelve months if fraud or duress); Maine, ME. ST. T. 18-A § 9-315 (fraud,
duress, mistake and final decree not entered); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(6)(a)
(West 2003) (fraud); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.056 (2003) (for cause); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-104 (1998) (reasonable time before accepted); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 127.080 (Michie 2002); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-16 (West 2002) (fraud, duress, or
misrepresentation); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-17 (Michie 1998) (involuntary of
fraud before final decree); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-6 (2000) (misrepresentation);
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1720 (Law. Co-op. 2002); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. TIT.
15A, §2-408 (2002) (fraud, duress, coercion or undue influence); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §
63.1-225 (Michie 2002) (before final order upon fraud or duress; after placement only upon
mutual consent); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.160 (2003) (fraud or duress); West
Virginia, W.VA. CODE § 48-4-5 (Michie 2001); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.46 (West 2003)
(involuntary consent); In re D.L.S., 332 N.W.2d 293 (Wis. 1983); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-22-109(dX1988) (fraud or duress). See also Catherine Sakach, Notes and Comments:
Withdrawal of Consent for Adoption: Allocating the Risk, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 879.
107. See Teresa Jacobsen, Effects of Postpartum Disorders on Parenting and on Offspring,
in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS, supra note 3, at 120-22.
108. Id.
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to be those that favor stable placement in permanent settings.' °9
Logic exists in this policy, as few would support the notion that
adoptions should be open to challenge by birth mothers long after
the child has become emotionally attached to the adoptive parents.
Nonetheless, those who facilitate adoptions are the least cost
avoiders in these contexts. 110 After all, it seems that, by definition,
postpartum depression will impair a mother's capacity to make
long-term, binding decisions about how and whether she can parent
her children.
Generally speaking, the only safeguard against the risk of a
birth mother relinquishing her child due to her postpartum illness
lies in statutorily imposed waiting periods."' Although the waiting
periods guard against 'hurried' decisions by birth mothers, they do
little to help those whose decisional capacity is impaired by
postpartum depression or psychosis. These women typically develop
symptoms weeks, and sometimes even months, after giving birth,"'
and they are unlikely to change their minds about a decision to
relinquish until after they have either been successfully treated, or
have recovered on their own.
Some states have adopted the 1994 Uniform Adoption Act,
which requires that a birth mother be offered counseling and a
lawyer prior to consenting to relinquish her child."' Although this
109. Although some children enter the adoption market when their parents are found unfit,
the vast majority begin the process after their parents voluntarily relinquish parental rights.
This relinquishment procedure is called "voluntary consent to adoption". See Brinig, supra
note 90, at 566.
110. A vast majority of states recognize both private placement and agency adoptions. In
an agency adoption, a biological mother gives her child to a licensed agency, which places the
child with a family of the agency's choosing. Usually, the child is placed in foster care until
the birth mother's consent becomes irrevocable. In order for the adoption to become final, a
social worker must give a satisfactory finding, which then leads to a judicial decree.
Generally, people disfavor agency adoptions because of their rigidity and long wait time for
a healthy infant. In an independent adoption, a biological mother places her child with a
family of her choice, typically with a doctor or lawyer acting as her intermediary. The adoptive
parents pay the biological mother's legal and medical fees, and usually take the baby home
immediately from the hospital. Most states require adoptive parents to undergo an
investigation by a social worker to determine their parental fitness. See Mindy Schulman
Roman, Note, Rethinking Revocation: Adoption from a New Perspective, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv.
733, 738 (1995).
111. Most state adoption laws contain provisions requiring a waiting period before signing,
signatures of witness, or notarization of the form contract, to protect the birth mother from
making a hurried decision when the physical and emotional stresses of childbirth might
impair her ability to make a rational decision. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(a)(2) (1996)
(requiring seventy two hours after birth to pass before a birth parent may execute consent).
112. See, e.g., G.G.V. v. J.L.R., 39 P.3d 1066 (Wyo. 2002).
113. In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws created a
comprehensive model adoption code, called the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA). The UAA
contains provisions regarding when a birth mother may consent, counseling options for birth
2003]
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is admirable in spirit, such a generic nod to the importance of
diagnostic counseling is unlikely to offer much protection to birth
mothers suffering from postpartum mental illness. Instead, those
who work with birth mothers should be required to assess the
possibility that a birth mother's decision to relinquish custody is
related to her postpartum mental illness, rather than the product
of an informed, long-term decision not to parent her child. Forcing
those who work on behalf of facilitating adoptions to evaluate the
mother's capacity to relinquish her child would minimize the risks
to both mother and child inherent in a making an irrevocable decision
to relinquish a child while in the throes of postpartum depression.
B. Postpartum Mental Illness and Child Custody Disputes
Child custody disputes are notoriously vicious in nature, and
it is no surprise to learn that there is a line of cases in which
fathers, seeking primary or sole custody, raise the issue of their ex-
wife's postpartum mental illness in support of their petitions."' It
is impossible to discern, from a review of reported cases, how often
claims relating to postpartum mental illness are raised in the
context of custody disputes, let alone how often they are
successful.15 What is noteworthy, however, is that although some
decisions mention postpartum mental illness in the list of factors
relating to its decision, almost no cases stop to explore the meaning
and the implications of such a diagnosis.
For example, several reported cases involving custody disputes
mentioned the fact that the mother had suffered from postpartum
illness following the child's birth.16 Yet none of these cases included
a substantive discussion of what that diagnosis meant, and of the
impact that it might have had on the mother's ability to parent, or
on the parents' relationship." 7 Instead, the fact that these mothers
were, in most cases, diagnosed, medicated and in some cases
hospitalized with postpartum mental illness, is mentioned almost
mothers prior to giving consent, and mandatory representation by counsel not affiliated with
the adoption agency. For example, the proposed UAA provides that the voluntary consent by
an unwed mother (those considered most vulnerable) must contain a statement that the
individual executing the consent has received or been offered counseling services. The UAA
has been adopted by a growing number of states. See generally Michelle Cucuzza, Note, The
Uniform Adoption Act: Strengthening New York's Protection for Unwed Mothers, 61 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 931, 934, 960 (1995) (discussing the Uniform Adoption Act).
114. See Meyer, et al., supra note 1, at 96-99.
115. Id. at 97.
116. See, e.g., G.G.V. v. J.L.R., 39 P.3d 1066 (Wyo. 2002); Davidson v. Davidson, 576 N.W. 2d
779 (Neb. 1998).
117. G.G.V., 39 P.3d 1066; Davidson, 576 N.W.3d 779.
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in passing."1 ' To be fair, many of these cases involve tragic situations
in which, for a variety of reasons, neither parent seems well suited
to caring for their children." 9 By the time the court sees the case,
postpartum mental illness really is just one of the many factors to
be weighed in determining the best placement for a child. 20
Sometimes, however, it is clear that the fact that the mother
became ill and was unable to function as her child's (or children's)
sole caretaker is the very thing that ultimately led to her loss of
custody. For instance, in both Bragg v. Horne"2 and Marriage of
Collingwood,22 both mothers permitted their husbands' parents to
assume roles as primary caretakers while they were hospitalized.'
Their relationships with their husbands became strained during the
course of their illnesses, and ultimately ended.' By the time the
mothers fully recovered and were able to care for their children, the
fathers had filed for divorce, and along with their parents, sought
custody of the children.2 s In Collingwood, the mother was denied
physical custody on the grounds that it would be disruptive to her
children.'26 In Bragg, the severely depressed mother succumbed to
pressure from her child's paternal grandmother to transfer custody
to her.127 Upon her recovery, her request to reassume custody of her
child was denied. 128
By definition, postpartum mental illness hinders a mother's
capacity to act as her child's primary caretaker. Recall that, in
addition to physiological causes, postpartum mental illness seems
to be triggered by social and cultural factors such as the lack of a
supportive home environment. 2 The divorce and custody challenges
that raise postpartum mental illness-related issues may be seen as
a testimony to the circular nature of the environmental factors that
contribute to, and are exacerbated by, a mother's postpartum
mental illness. Although their primary task is to determine the
child's best interests, courts evaluating custody disputes raising
postpartum mental illness-related claims would do well to consider
118. G.G.V., 39 P.3d 1066; Davidson, 576 N.W.3d 779.
119. G.G.V., 39 P.3d 1066; Davidson, 576 N.W.3d 779.
120. G.G.V., 39 P.3d 1066; Davidson, 576 N.W.3d 779.
121. 764 So.2d 1177 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2000).
122. 460 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa App.1990).
123. Bragg, 764 So.2d, at 1178; Collingwood, 460 N.W.2d at 487.
124. Bragg, 764 So.2d, at 1178; Collingwood, 460 N.W.2d at 487.
125. Bragg, 764 So.2d, at 1178; Collingwood, 460 N.W.2d at 487.
126. 460 N.W.2d at 488.
127. 764 So.2d at 1179.
128. Id. at 1182.
129. See Meyer et al., supra note 1, at 94.
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these factors in their cases, particularly when assessing the
mother's competence as a parent.
C. Postpartum Mental Illness and Termination of Parental
Rights Cases
Like custody disputes, cases involving the termination of a
mother's parental rights frequently raise the issue of postpartum
mental illness. Most often, the mother raises the issue in her own
defense. In some cases, mothers raise the claim of postpartum
depression years after their children were born, and without any
medical evidence that they suffered from such a condition, in an
effort to excuse years of abusive and neglectful behavior.130
Such cases call attention to the challenges inherent in
recognizing a 'syndrome defense' based on postpartum mental
illness. The phenomenon of postpartum mental illness is undeniably
real, it impairs a woman's capacity to mother her child,"'1 and it
requires medical treatment. 3 2 Until recently, so little attention has
been paid to postpartum mental illness that it largely went
undiagnosed." Moreover, the problem of access to care, and in
particular to mental health care, remains a forceful barrier to
treatment for many mothers who struggle with postpartum mental
illness.33 All this being true, to the extent that courts are receptive
130. See, e.g., In re Alexandra C., 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 917 (Conn. Super., 2002), in which
a mother with a lifelong history of severe mental illness, including 20 hospitalizations and 10
suicide attempts, blamed her failure to visit her daughter over the course of her first year of
life, when the daughter-resided in foster care, on the fact that she had postpartum depression.
See also, In re A.D., 1998 WL 418040 (Tex. App. Hous. 1 Dist 1998) (unpublished opinion)
(rejecting the mother's assertion that her bad parenting was due to postpartum depression,
noting that she had not sought medical treatment for this condition).
131. See Jacobsen, supra note 107, at 120-22.
132. Steiner & Tam, supra note 4, at 48.
133. Id.
134. In trying to limit the costs of health, accident, and disability insurance policies, the
underwriters of many policies limit or exclude benefits coverage for mental illnesses or
disorders. Generally, mental diseases that have physical causes typically are covered, while
mental disorders that are primarily psychiatric in nature are excluded. Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, What Constitutes Mental Illness or Disorder, Insanity, or the Like, Within Provision
Limiting or Excluding Coverage Under Health or Disability Policy, 19 A.L.R. 5th 533, 540-41
(2001). Zitter describes the Blake case, in which the extensive psychiatric treatment of a
patient suffering from postpartum depression after childbirth was excluded from coverage
under a group health policy because it was termed a "mental" illness. Id. at 547-48 (citing
Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990)). See infra notes
155-58 and accompanying text (describing the role played by this distinction in coverage
determinations).
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to postpartum mental illness-based explanations for negligent or
abusive parenting, it is inevitable that a far broader class of
mothers will attempt to excuse their unlawful behavior toward their
children by attributing it to postpartum mental illness.
In view of this problem, one might expect that cases involving
the termination of parental rights would require a relatively
close scrutiny of the woman's medical condition. It is important to
reiterate that it is impossible to generalize about the judicial
treatment of cases involving postpartum mental illness using only the
information available through reported cases. But it is noteworthy
that among reported cases there are virtually no reported decisions
that analyze the meaning and the impact of postpartum mental
illness on the mother's treatment of her infant.3 Instead, courts
generally consider the mother's claim that she suffered from
postpartum mental illness by placing it into the context of her other
reported activities and behavior when making their ruling.1"
This approach is completely understandable in many termination
cases, in which the mother's capacity for providing a safe and
loving home seems to be virtually nonexistent. Yet there are also
cases whose facts suggest that the mothers temporarily lost or
relinquished custody when suffering from postpartum mental
illness, and that once their children became temporary wards of the
state it was extremely difficult to regain custody." 7 This remained
true even after the mothers had recovered from their postpartum
illness, and worked to comply with reunification plans. 3 '
Perhaps the saddest thing that can be observed about this line
of cases is that they seem to depict in stark terms precisely what
mental health experts have concluded: that postpartum mental
illness is related both to physiological and to social conditions.'39
Thus, these cases involve mothers who tend to be profoundly
135. See supra notes 109-110, and accompanying text.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., In re Smith Children, 1990 WL 70926 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 1990) (unpublished
opinion), in which a very young mother of 5 children developed postpartum depression,
referred her family to children's services, and began fighting for reunification with them 18
months later, upon her recovery and compliance with the State's reunification plan. The State
opposed reunification on the grounds that the children were emotionally disturbed and would
be too difficult for the mother and father to handle. In spite of the Guardian ad Litem's report,
which found that the children's instability largely was due to the transient and restrictive
nature of their foster care placements, the State opposed reunification and appealed a lower
court decision granting custody to the parents. The appellate court agreed with the lower
court's decision, and ultimately, the children were returned to their parents.
138. Id.
139. See, Margaret G. Spinelli, Prevention of Postpartum Mood Disorders, in POSTPARTUM
MOOD DISORDERS, supra note 3, at 219-29.
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mentally disturbed, and in many cases were ill before they had their
children." These women's experience of postpartum mental illness
constitutes just one more destabilizing factor in their lives--one
that often brings them to the attention of state agencies whose job
it is to protect children.141 Unlike the mothers who temporarily lose
custody, but are successfully reunited with their children, it seems
that little can be done to help these women build the support
network they need in order to parent their children.14
2
From this perspective, the risk that these mothers might
fabricate postpartum mental illness as a defense seems to matter
quite little. Courts are unlikely to be hoodwinked by this strategy,
given the multiplicity of factors that already hinder reunification
in these cases. The larger problem would appear to be the reverse.
Specifically, there are cases in which a mother suffers from a genuine,
but time-delimited case of postpartum mental illness, and because
of her limited support system, requires state involvement in order
to provide care for her children." In these cases, the mother's
marginal economic status may prejudice a court's determination
regarding reunification long after she is healthy and able to parent
her children. This problem may be seen in the line of appellate court
cases overturning trial court orders terminating parental custody.'"
Although the mothers in these specific cases ultimately prevailed
and were reunited with their children, the reunification process took
many months and even years. Thus, these cases must be viewed
not simply as instances in which "the system" worked, but also as
grave, if delimited, tragedies for the children and their parents, who
were plunged into the chaos of disrupted custody and separation
from one another.
140. Michelle Oberman, A Brief History ofInfanticide and the Law, in INFANTICIDE, supra
note 1, at 13.
141. Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 73, at 37-38.
142. Id.
143. In re Child of B.J.C & C.J.C., 2001 WL 267468 (Minn. App., 2001) (unpublished
opinion) (Plaintiff's mother and father challenged the district court's determination that their
child was in need of child protective services, where the mother was suffering from mental
illness related to postpartum depression. The appellate court reversed the district court's
findings, concluding that their findings of fact were insufficient to sustain their decision that
the child's best interests were served by being apart from her parents); In re Cory M., 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. App. 1 Dist., 1992) (A biological mother appealed a trial court order
terminating reunification services and authorizing proceedings to terminate her parental
rights. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in ordering termination
proceedings); Edwards v. County of Arlington, 361 S.E.2d 644 (Va. App., 1987) (A biological
mother appealed the termination of her parental rights. The appellate court reversed, noting
that the mother was diagnosed with an atypical psychosis).
144. Id
2003] LADY MADONNA, CHILDREN AT YOUR FEET
III. DISABILITY BENEFITS AND POSTPARTUM MENTAL ILLNESS
If postpartum mental illness impairs a woman's ability to
function as a primary caretaker for her child, it likely has a similar
effect on a woman's capacity to return to employment outside of the
home. The resumption of employment following the birth of a child
is taxing even for a healthy woman. Much has been written about
the second-shift, and the extent to which women, rather than their
husbands, are likely to absorb the bulk of new labor created when
a child is added to a household.' To the extent that a new mother
is struggling with postpartum depression, this transition is
necessarily more difficult. There is much literature on depression,
illustrating the detrimental effect that depression has on the
workforce, and demonstrating that a surprisingly large percentage
of the population struggles with this particular mental illness."7
Until quite recently, relatively few of those affected sought
treatment for depression. Medical studies indicate that a high
percentage of those seeking treatment are inappropriately treated,
which reflects both the failure of doctors to keep pace with new
145. For women who recently have had a child, going back to work can be very difficult. In
American homes with both parents working, women do approximately two-thirds of the work
at home, including childcare, cooking, and cleaning. Women tend to devote more of their time
at home to housework and proportionately less of it to childcare, the household job they would
prefer to do. Women more often do two or more things at once, causing them to have to juggle
and balance household tasks. As a result, women tend to talk more about being emotionally
sick, overtired, and emotionally drained. See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT
(1989) (finding that one reason that half the lawyers, doctors, and other professionals are not
women is because men do not share the raising of their children and the caring of their
homes). See also RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES AND
BARGAINING POWER (Susan Rabiner ed., 1995) (arguing that who does what at home shapes
the entire economy outside the home).
146. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 145; MAHONY, supra note 145.
147. A study in the Journal of the American Medical Association documents the
overwhelming scope of depression in the United States, as well as its huge impact on job
productivity. Walter F. Stewart et al., Cost of Lost Productive Work Time Among US Workers
with Depression, 289 JAMA 3135 (2003). The study of lost worker productivity estimates that
the illness costs employers an extra $31 billion a year in lost productive time. Id. The study
found that 9.4 percent of the American workforce was suffering from some type of depressive
disorder during a given two-week period. Id. Rather than use sick days, employees with
clinical depression go to their jobs, despite feeling sad, irritable, or distracted. Such reduced
performance can account for eighty percent of lost productivity. At female-dominated
workplaces, the effect can be doubled because women suffer from depression almost twice as
much as men. Because depression often is stigmatized, difficult to identify, and untreated,
many employers do not press health insurers to provide mental health coverage in the same
way they cover other medical procedures. See Marilyn Elias, Americans with Major Depression
Don't Get Adequate Treatment, USA TODAY, June 18,2003, at D4; Patricia Guthrie, Depression
Costs Firms $31 Billion Every Year, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 18, 2003, at Al; Karen
Patterson, Depression's Reach Profound, DALLAS MORNING NEws, June 18, 2003, at 1A.
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developments in pharmaceutical interventions for treating mental
illness, as well as a societal bias against mental illness in general.'"
Nowhere is this truer than in cases of postpartum mental illness.
Women are slow to seek help for postpartum mental illness and the
doctors they are most likely to see (their obstetricians and their
child's pediatricians) typically do not possess special training in
postpartum mental health issues.14 9 Moreover, even the mental
health experts do not necessarily agree on standard courses of
intervention and treatment for postpartum mental illness."'5 Thus,
it may take several months or more of treatment before a woman
suffering from postpartum mental illness is able to perform her job
at full capacity.' 5'
A series of cases involving employment termination and
insurance benefits highlights this problem. These cases arise
because of the extent to which access to mental healthcare
treatment, and to healthcare benefits in general in the United
States, is tied either to one's employment or to one's spouse's
employment. Thus, loss of employment triggers a loss of access to
healthcare. Moreover, employment itself does not guarantee access
148. "Historically, individuals with a mental illness have been treated with contempt, fear,
and cruelty [because there was no] medical explanation for [the] individual's strange
behavior." See Keith Nelson, Comment, Legislative and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health
Parity: S. 543, Reasonable Accommodation, and an Individualized Remedy Under Title 1 of
the ADA, 51 AM. U.L. REv. 91, 97. Cultures therefore concluded that "mental illness stemmed
from parental misdeeds, demonic possession, or simply deficient character." Id. Despite
medical advances, society continues to harbor a deeply held suspicion both of mental illnesses
and the mentally ill. Id. at 98-99.
Surveys show that mental disabilities are the most negatively perceived of all
disabilities. Individuals with mental illness are denied jobs, refused access to
apartments in public housing or entry to places in public accommodation.
Behavioral myths have emerged suggesting that persons with mental
disabilities are deviant, worth less than 'normal' individuals, are
disproportionately dangerous and are presumptively incompetent.
Michael L. Perlin, The Americans with Disabilities Act: 'What's Good is Bad, What's Bad is
Good, You'll Find Out When You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom": Are the Americans with
Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L. C.) Anything More Than "Idiot Wind"?, 35 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 235, 236 (2001) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Perlin, Idiot Wind]. In 2002,
about 13 million Americans suffered from an episode of major depression, according to the
Journal of the American Medical Association. It is estimated that depression affects about 34
million Americans at some point in their lives. However, the 2003 study found that only one-
third to one-half of people suffering from depression seek treatment. Stigma prevents some
people from getting help. People discuss mental illness less openly than they would a physical
illness, and therefore do not seek treatment as readily. Moreover, access to treatment is
severely restricted in rural areas, and for those who are uninsured or under-insured. See
generally supra note 147.
149. See Meyer et al., supra note 1, at 101.
150. See id. at 91.
151. Id. at 101-02.
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to mental health care, as most employee benefits packages severely
limit coverage for mental illness.152 Consistent with well-established
principles, these cases give women seeking relief the burden of
establishing that their employer or insurer's policies discriminated
against them on statutorily prohibited grounds, such as gender or
disability.15 As such, the central issue in these cases is the extent
to which a policy treats postpartum mental illness differently from
other, more generic varieties of mental illness,54 and the extent to
which a woman suffering from postpartum mental illness has a
legally recognized disability.
Unlike other civil cases raising postpartum mental illness, 55
these cases contain a considerable amount of judicial analysis of
postpartum mental illness. The most curious aspect of these cases
is that their analysis of the problem is driven by quirks in the
governing law, and is, as a result, almost absurdly disconnected
from the nature and impact of postpartum mental illness.
Specifically, employers and insurers, in an effort to limit the high
costs of health-related employment benefits, tend to choose policies
with clauses that limit their liability for insurance claims related to
mental disorders. 15 6 Because so many illnesses manifest with
mental as well as physical symptoms, courts have struggled over the
interpretation of these clauses. 57 Many courts distinguish between
mental disorders that can be traced to "physical" causes and those
that are of "psychiatric" origin." "Physical" ailments merit
coverage, while those of "psychiatric origin" are excluded.' 59 Other
courts consider the nature of the treatment provided, and the extent
to which the treatment was "psychiatric" in nature.1 60 To the extent
that treatment is "psychiatric," it is not covered.' 61 Finally, some
152. See, e.g., Roland Sturm & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Mental Health Parity and
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in 1999-2000: . Limits, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 11
(Nov. 2002) available at http://www.rand.org/health/articles/partity.datapointl.pdf.
153. In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994). "The ADA was enacted to 'provide strong, consistent, [and] enforceable
standards [for] ending discrimination against individuals with disabilities' and to bring such
individuals into the economic and social mainstream of American life." Elizabeth A. Pendo,
Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing the Three Face ofReasonable Accommodation,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1175, 1178 (2002).
154. See supra §§ II A and II B.
155. See generally Zitter, supra note 134.
156. See id. at 533, 540.
157. Id.
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courts merely determine whether a layman's understanding of the
clause would have included treatment for a given illness. 62
One might think that these tests would bode well for the
coverage of postpartum mental illness. There is abundant evidence
of the physiological causes of postpartum mental illness, and the
standard treatment for postpartum mental illness typically includes
medication in addition to talk therapy."a In addition, ignorance
about postpartum mental illness is so pervasive that it is hard to
imagine what a layman's understanding of this group of disorders
would be.' While it may appear that these factors would increase
the likelihood of allowing coverage of mental illness, postpartum
mental illnesses have-been excluded from coverage under all three
of these tests.
The landmark case on this topic is Blake v. Unionmutual Stock
Life Insurance." A mother, Pamela Blake, incurred $33,279.55 in
unpaid medical bills following hospitalization and treatment for
severe postpartum depression.' Her insurance policy limited
coverage for mental illness to thirty days of inpatient care and
$1,000 of outpatient treatment16 7 In contrast, the policy provided
much more generous coverage for "sickness," which included
pregnancy-related claims.'" Therefore, Ms. Blake argued that her
postpartum depression was a physical or organic "sickness" caused
by her pregnancy 6 9 Her medical expert testified regarding the
manner in which postpartum mental illness is brought about by
hormonal shifts following pregnancy, and the time-limited nature
of postpartum mental illness, which accounted for the fact that, by
the time of trial, Ms. Blake was mentally well.'7 Nonetheless, the
court rejected this testimony, finding that there was no proof that
her illness had an "organic" basis because Ms. Blake's physician
never tested her hormone levels.17' Thus, the court denied coverage
for her expenses, on the grounds that her postpartum mental illness
was mental, rather than physical, in origin.
162. Id.
163. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 53, at 50-75.
164. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 10, at 11.
165. 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990).




170. Id. at 1529.
171. 906 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1990).
172. Id.
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Reported cases in which a woman claims that she was fired or
otherwise discriminated against while suffering from a postpartum
mental illness similarly tend to run afoul of general laws governing
discrimination in the workplace. For example, consider Nweke v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America,' a complicated decision
involving a former insurance agent who claimed, among other
things, that her company violated prohibitions against both gender
and disability-related discrimination in terminating her employment. 7 4
The plaintiff, Ms. Nweke, presented evidence of derogatory
treatment by her supervisor, beginning when she announced her
pregnancy, and continuing through her struggles with pregnancy-
related and postpartum depression. 175 In addition she adduced ample
evidence of her diagnosis with and treatment for acute depression.
Ms. Nweke suffered from a major depressive disorder that began
during pregnancy and continued during the months after delivery.17 1
Concern about retaining her job and her disability benefits
prompted her return to work. First, she returned for several days,
just one week after she was diagnosed with major depression and
placed on psychotropic medication, and then permanently, the day
after her disability benefits expired. 7 7 Upon her return, Ms. Nweke
was assigned a new, less-experienced supervisor, who had been
promoted to a supervisor position instead of her, because according
to Ms. Nweke's manager, the coworker in question was a woman
past child-bearing age who would not leave to have children.' 7
Several weeks after her return Ms. Nweke was placed on probation
due to her "low productivity" in the preceding year (during which
she worked only six months). 179 Her ability to meet her target
performance goals during probation was hindered by the fact that
many of her clients or files were reassigned while she was absent on
short-term disability leave. ° Ms. Nweke struggled and succeeded
in meeting her probationary goals for the first two quarters of her
173. 25 F. Supp. 2d 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 209.
176. Id.
177. Id. Because it can take four weeks for the full therapeutic effect of such medications
to be realized, there was little reason to expect that Ms. Nweke would have recovered
sufficiently to perform her job. See, e.g., ELI LILLY & CO., FLUOXETINE (PRoZAC] PACKAGE
INSERT (2003), available at httplpi.lilly.comfprozac.pdf at 23 (last accessed Oct. 15, 2003)
(finding that similar to "other drugs effective in the treatment of major depressive disorder,
the full effect [of Prozac] may be delayed until 4 weeks of treatment or longer.")
178. Nweke, 25 F. Supp.2d, at 209.
179. Id. at 211.
180. Id.
2003]
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probation."5s She failed, however, to meet the target for the third
period, and one year after she returned to work, she was dismissed
from her job.5 2
In dismissing Newke's complaints on summary judgment, the
court held that:
Nweke bears the burden "of presenting evidence that
[Prudential] perceived her to be incapable of working a broad
range of jobs suitable for a person of her age, experience, and
training because of her disability." ... She has presented no such
evidence. Granted, Nweke was terminated because she failed to
satisfy the LPP requirements [her probationary productivity
quota]. However, there is no indication that Prudential believed
that she could not "keep up" because of her depression.'
To the extent that Ms. Nweke's testimony is believed, it is not
surprising that she ultimately failed to make the adjustment back
into a competitive and somewhat hostile workplace. Her depression
and the considerable efforts required in parenting a child,
particularly in the first year of life, all weighed against the odds
that she could overcome the probationary quota requirement.
Perhaps the saddest aspect is the fact that it was her effort to
succeed that, in the end, doomed her case. Ultimately, it was her
struggle to perform as a good employee that undermined her ability
to show that she was disabled by her condition.'" Once again, the
lens through which the law views postpartum mental illness misses
the full scope of the nature and impact of this set of disorders.'
181. Id.
182. Id. at 212.
183. Id. at 229. (quoting Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 872).
184. Id. at 228, in which the court found that, because the plaintiff was able to function
well enough to return to work, she did not carry her burden in proving that she was
.substantially limited in her ability to perform a major life activity."
185. The same is true for the treatment of many other mental illnesses under the ADA or
ERISA. See generally Michael L. Perlin, 'Make Promises by the Hour: Sex, Drugs, the ADA,
and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947, 950 (1997 ) (discussing application
of the ADA to individuals in inpatient psychiatric hospitals); Nelson, supra note 148 (finding
that despite the rise in litigation since the enactment of the ADA on equal coverage of mental
illnesses, the overarching conclusion has been that unequal coverage does not constitute
illegal discrimination under the ADA); Perlin, Idiot Wind, supra note 148 (finding that the
ADA did not prove to be a panacea for citizens with mental disabilities).
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IV. POSTPARTUM MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE STRUCTURE
OF MOTHERHOOD
As we have seen, generally speaking, the law governing
mental illness does not prescribe long inquiries into a person's
circumstances, or the social or cultural factors that might give
rise to or exacerbate a particular mental disorder. Instead, the law
confines itself to narrow, binary inquiries regarding a person's
mental state.18 Is she sane? Was she competent? Is she disabled?
For the most part, these inquiries bring little legal relief to women
whose postpartum mental illness got them into legal difficulties.
More likely than not, women suffering from postpartum mental
illness will not be sick enough to have their crimes or mistakes
excused, nor will they be able to demand accommodation on the
basis of their disability. Yet a close examination of the facts that
underlie these cases demonstrates that the legal inquiry often
misses the most compelling evidence. In many cases, the fact of the
woman's mental illness, in conjunction with her social, economic,
and cultural circumstances, argues in support of mitigating her
culpability for her criminal acts, or of diminishing her responsibility
for her civil wrongs.'87
There is no readily apparent solution to this problem. A move
by the courts to embrace a postpartum syndrome defense, in the
criminal context, might help a small percentage of the women who
commit criminal acts while suffering from postpartum mental
illness.' 88 There are women whose postpartum psychosis renders
them legally insane at the time they commit a crime, and they
should have the benefit of this defense. Yet experience with other
"syndromes" (e.g. battered women's syndrome, rape trauma syndrome)
teaches us that these syndrome-defenses are far from a panacea.'89
186. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 10, at 70-71.
187. See, e.g., Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 1, at 95 (discussing exculpation of criminal
defendants; Id. at 97-101 (discussing women's mental illness in civil cases).
188. See Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 1, at 180-81 (providing discussion of effects ofjudicial
recognition of a postpartum syndrome defense in criminal cases).
189. Women's defenses such as battered women's syndrome or rape trauma syndrome
recognize women's unique biology and socialization within the legal system. Some feminists
are critical of the use of women's legal defenses because they invoke traditional notions that
women are in need of protection, and create a notion of an "ideal" abused woman. They are
concerned that such defenses might be seen as evidencing women's biological inferiority to
men. Arguments against using the battered women's syndrome as a defense include the
"tendency for the experiences of the abused women to be overshadowed by expert testimony;
the negative ramifications of syndromization; and the boundaries imposed by creating the
'ideal' abused women." See Meyer et al., supra note 1, at 97 (citing Lori G. Beaman, Women's
Defenses: Contextualizing Dilemmas of Difference and Power, in WOMEN AND CRIMINAL
2003]
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They likely will be interpreted narrowly, thus excluding from
coverage those women whose symptoms are in some manner
atypical. Moreover, the vast majority of women who get ensnared
with the law when suffering from postpartum mental illness will not
be deemed sick enough, and thus, will not be helped by a court's
willingness to recognize postpartum psychosis as a variety of the
insanity defense.' 9°
An alternative model for broadening the legal lens through
which the law views women with postpartum mental illness is found
in criminal law, under the contemporary partial defense of extreme
emotional disturbance." This standard, found in the Model Penal
Code, reflects a modernization of the old "heat of passion" defense
to homicide charges.
Today, the heat of passion defense uses an "objective standard"
that requires juries to determine whether the reasonable person
would have been sufficiently impassioned by the provocation to kill. "9
The Model Penal Code goes one step further and adds a subjective
component."9 Under the Model Penal Code, juries look at whether
there was a reasonable explanation for the extreme emotional
disturbance.' But the Code also requires the jurors to determine the
reasonableness of the defendant's response to her circumstances,
from her viewpoint.195 Its underlying premise is that people
JUSTICE, 9(3), 87-88 (1998)). See also Hope Toffel, Note, Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and
Evil Children: Confronting the Myths about Battered People Who Kill Their Abusers, and the
Argument for Extending Battering Syndrome Self-Defenses to All Victims of Domestic Violence,
70 S. CAL L. REv. 337 (1996); David L. Faigmen & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman
Syndrome in theAge of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 101, n.235 (1997). Other critics argue that
the application of rape trauma syndrome and the battered women's syndrome favor women,
a politically potent group who are easily viewed as victims, while disfavoring the bulk of
criminal defendants. For example, young African-American males living in a world of violence
are often not allowed to introduce social science evidence in their defense. See Janet C. Hoffel,
Essay: The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission of Social Science Evidence in
Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41 (2001).
190. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 10, at 70-73.
191. The manslaughter provision of the Model Penal Code states that criminal homicide
constitutes manslaughter when it is "committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness
of such explanation or excuse shal [sic) be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.3(lXb). The Model Penal Code, which has been adopted by a substantial minority of
jurisdictions, thus introduces a subjective component into the extreme emotional disturbance
defense. Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 73, at 86-88.
192. See Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 73, at 86-87.
193. Id. at 86.
194. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(lXb).
195. Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73
J. CFIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY421,443 (1982)(notingthat "[t lhe defense is theoretically applicable
even if the victim was not a provoker").
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sometimes intentionally act in a criminal manner (i.e. killing), but
extenuating circumstances exist that mitigate their culpability."'
Interestingly, this is the same sentiment that underlies the
Infanticide Acts, which are predicated upon a scientifically improbable
belief that "the balance of her [a woman's] mind" may be disturbed
for a period of twelve months following childbirth for reasons
deriving from labor and delivery or lactation. 97 In effect, however,
the Infanticide Acts recognize as unique the circumstances that
might lead a mother to harm her child in the first year of its life. As
a result, they limit the severity of the legal charge to manslaughter,
and they implicitly endorse non-incarceration, and sentences
involving probation and counseling. 8
I have no delusions that the extreme emotional disturbance
defense, adopted only by a handful of jurisdictions in the homicide
context, and never used in defending a filicide case, will be
widely adopted as a partial defense in postpartum mental illness
cases. Nor do I offer this partial defense as an alternative to using
postpartum syndromes as full excuses in those cases in which medical
diagnosis and expert testimony demonstrate that a woman was
rendered insane and/or legally incompetent by virtue of her
postpartum mental illness.
Instead, the extreme emotional disturbance approach to
understanding postpartum mental illness is interesting, in large
part, as a thought-experiment. In examining the extent to which the
woman's actions were responsive to her environment, we are asked
to consider the circumstances that contributed to the terrible thing
that occurred. Rather than confining us to a scientific model, and to
irrelevant questions such as the extent to which her postpartum
mental illness is of physical or psychiatric origin, the extreme
emotional disturbance approach lets us ask why this woman failed
to behave as the law would have her behave.
There are obvious problems with such an approach. First, the
observation that criminal or other aberrant behavior may result
from failings in an individual's social, economic or cultural background
applies far beyond the scope of postpartum mental illness. Thus,
allowing such factors to mitigate legal responsibility could
destabilize the entire legal system. Moreover, such an approach is
ripe for abuse, in that women will invoke postpartum mental illness
as an excuse for a host of criminal and otherwise problematic acts
196. Id. at 442-43.
197. See supra note 10, at 11 (regarding the debate on this issue among U.S. experts).
198. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 10, at 11.
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that, in reality, had little to do with their having had a child, let
alone a postpartum mental illness. Finally, to the extent that the
legal system comes to embrace the notion that a woman may be
destabilized during the first year following the birth of a child, there
is a credible threat that all women will be treated as less than fully
competent legal citizens.1 9
My response to the first of these concerns is that indeed, it may
be the case that our entire jurisprudence of criminal responsibility
needs to be reworked in view of contemporary understandings of the
interplay between mental illness and human behavior. Such a task
is well beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, women
suffering from postpartum mental illness should not be held hostage
by such a fear. To the extent that one understands postpartum
mental disorders as legitimate manifestations of mental illness,
responsive to either or both the physiological and the socio-cultural
realities affecting a particular mother, it is unjust and illegitimate
to ignore available information regarding the nature and scope of
these illnesses.
Next, there is the fear that recognizing the impact of external
factors in shaping the legal system's response to a woman suffering
from postpartum mental illness will lead to the widespread abuse
of such 'excuses.' The reply to this concern is that the abuse of
postpartum mental illness as an 'excuse' already is happening.
There have been cases in which women have sought to blame their
role in an armed robbery or drug deal on the fact that they were
suffering from postpartum mental illness at the time that they
committed the crime.2" To date, judges have been quite astute in
reviewing the medical information offered in support of such
defenses. There is little reason to believe that they would be unable
to discern the legitimacy of postpartum mental illness-related
199. Exceptionalizing women threatens to deny them the "same capacity for self-
governance that is attributed to men." Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALL. REV.
1, 6 (1994). Professor Coughlin elaborates on this point, noting that:
If women achieve leniency by exploiting, rather than challenging and revising,
the existing categories of excuse, they not only leave the theory of criminal
responsibility intact, they also leave intact the competing life stories that the
theory constructs and makes available for excused actors and responsible human
beings to experience. The experience of the responsible actor is one that
resonates powerfully in our culture and, by securing excuse, women assure that
it is one that will continue to be denied to them.
Id. at 25 (internal citations omitted).
200. See Paul v. State, 2002 WL 1902199 (Ga. App. 2002 ) (Affirming conviction of armed
robbery defendant despite assertion that Defendant was suffering from postpartum
depression); People v. Batcher, 736 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002 ) (affirming conviction
of drug-dealing defendant despite assertion of postpartum depression).
LADY MADONNA, CHILDREN AT YOUR FEET
claims, even in the event that a greater number of women elected to
invoke such claims in their legal actions.
Finally, there is the concern that all women would be
pathologized in the event that the legal system came to embrace
the notion that mental illness may be due, in part, to the conditions
under which a mother attempts to raise her child. I believe that,
should this unlikely event come to pass, it actually may be salutary
for society as a whole, and in particular for mothers. Indeed, if there
is one lesson to be gleaned, it is that so very much of what goes
wrong at the intersection of motherhood, madness and the law is
foreseeable and often preventable. To the extent that the legal
system considers the circumstances that shape the fabric of the daily
life of its litigants who raise postpartum mental illness-related
claims, it likely will bring into focus the very factors that led to her
legal troubles. In so doing, the law might be able to nudge society in
the direction of change, by forcing us to focus on what we can do to
alter the circumstances that give rise to the tragedies associated
with postpartum mental illness.
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